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Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure communications. In order to improve
the secret key rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-state method is proposed.
Concomitantly, there is a basis-independent detection efficiency condition, which usually cannot be
satisfied in a practical system, such as the time-phase encoding. Fortunately, this flaw has been
recently removed theoretically and experimentally using the fact that the expected yields of single-
photon states prepared in two bases stay the same for a given measurement basis. However, the
security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. In this work, we
provide the rigorous finite-key security bounds for four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD against
coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. Furthermore, we build a time-phase
encoding system with 200 MHz clocked to implement this protocol, in which the real-time secret
key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode fiber.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption is an important foundation for ensuring in-
formation security. With the rapid development of quan-
tum computing technology, current public-key encryp-
tion systems will be seriously threatened. Quantum key
distribution (QKD) allows two remote users to exchange
information-theoretic secure key via the quantum laws.
Since the first QKD protocol, BB84, was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. After nearly 40 years of
development, BB84 QKD has become the most practical
protocol in quantum information science [2]. By exploit-
ing the weak coherent light to replace the single-photon
source, the security and feasibility of BB84 QKD have
been widely demonstrated experimentally in fiber [3–
8], free space [9, 10] and chip integration [11–13] with
the help of decoy-state method [14, 15]. To implement
the qubit encoding of QKD, one usually has three op-
tions: polarization, phase and time-phase. Recent years,
the time-phase encoding has received increasing favor in
practical system due to two advantages. One is that the
reference frame is independent in time basis, which leads
a stable and low bit error rate in raw key [16]. The other
is the polarization disturbance immunity in both time
and phase bases, which can be deployed in complex field
environment while polarization coding systems cannot.
The original BB84 protocol and its security proof [17]
directly provide the phase error rate via the total bit er-
ror rate of two bases, which is based on the symmetry
of two bases. There are three conditions of this pro-
tocol: basis-independent probability selected by Alice,
basis-independent probability selected by Bob and the
basis-independent detection efficiency, which results in
that only half of the raw data can be used to extract
key. In order to satisfy the basis-independent detection
efficiency condition, one has to reduce the detection effi-
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ciency (including intrinsic loss and efficiency of detector
at the receiver) of two bases to be consistent [2–5, 10],
resulting in the lower key rate.
Although QKD can provide fresh secure key in real-
time [2], the low secret key rate is always the Achilles’
heel if one applies the one-time pad encryption. The
key rate can be directly doubled at most through the
efficient BB84 scheme [18] without any new technique
requirement. The efficient BB84 scheme exploits the bi-
ased basis choice and removes the basis-independent de-
tection efficiency condition. To further increase the key
rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-
state method is proposed [19–21] by an additional basis-
independent detection efficiency condition that usually
cannot be satisfied and brings security loopholes in the
practical system. Recently, a four-intensity decoy-state
BB84 QKD [22] uses a subtle fact, the expected yields of
single-photon component prepared in two bases are the
same for a given measurement basis, to remove basis-
independent detection efficiency condition and provide a
higher key rate. A proof-of-principle experiment [23] with
polarization encoding has shown tens of times key rate
improvement in the case of large basis detection efficiency
asymmetry. However, the security and feasibility of this
protocol are acquired in the finite data with an assump-
tion that Eve is restricted to particular types of attacks.
Unfortunately, such assumptions cannot be guaranteed
in reality.
In this work, we provide the rigorous finite-key anal-
ysis for four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol.
The security analysis is based on a combination of en-
tropy uncertainty relation [24, 25] and a finite-key secu-
rity bounds [26]. We exploit the autonomous time-phase
encoding system to experimentally realize this protocol
and continuously distribute secret keys for two months,
where there is a 1.8 dB difference between the efficiency
of two bases at the receiver. The real-time extracted se-
cret key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode
fiber and can be secure against coherent attacks in the
2universally composable framework [27].
II. COHERENT SECURITY
We consider a four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD
protocol, where the basis and intensity chosen with prob-
abilities that are biased. Specifically, the intensities of Z
basis sent by Alice are µ and ν, the intensity of X basis
is ω, together with the vacuum state without basis in-
formation. The bases Z and X are selected by Bob with
probabilities qz and qx = 1 − qz, respectively. The fol-
lowing is a detailed description of the protocol.
1. Preparation. Alice exploits the laser to prepare weak
pulses with intensities µ and ν in Z basis, ω in X basis and
the vacuum state given by a random bit yi. The proba-
bility of selecting intensity k is pk with k ∈ {µ, ν, ω, 0}.
The weak optical pulses go through the insecure quantum
channel to Bob.
2. Measurement. Bob randomly selects basis Z and
X with probabilities qz and qx to measure the received
pulses, respectively. Bob records the effective events and
corresponding bit y′i. At least one detector click means
an effective event. For multiple detector click, he ran-
domly records a bit value and a basis for passive basis
detection.
3. Reconciliation. Alice and Bob exploit the authenti-
cated classical channel to announce the effective event,
basis and intensity information. They repeat steps 1 to
3 until |Zk| ≥ n
z
k and |Xk| ≥ n
x
k, where the Zk (n
z
k) is set
(number) of k intensity prepared by Alice and measured
in Z basis by Bob.
4. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob select a size
of nzµ + n
z
ν in Zµ ∪ Zν to get a raw key pair (ZA,ZB).
They announce the bit value of set Xω and compute the
corresponding number of bit error mxω. All sets are used
to compute the observed number of vacuum events szz0
and single-photon events szz1 and the observed phase er-
ror rate of single-photon events φzz1 in ZA. If φ
zz
1 ≤ φtol,
they move on to step 5. Otherwise, they abort the data
and start again.
5. Postprocessing. Alice and Bob apply an error cor-
rection with leaking at most λEC bits of information.
They adopt a universal2 hash function to perform an
error-verification by consuming ⌈log2
1
εcor
⌉ bits of infor-
mation [28]. At last, they use a universal2 hash function
to perform privacy amplification on their raw key to get
a secret key pair (SA,SB) with ℓ bits.
The four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol is
εcor-correct and εsec-secret in the universally composable
framework with [25, 26]
ℓ =szz0 + s
zz
1
[
1− h
(
φ
zz
1
)]
− λEC − log2
2
εcor
− 6 log2
22
εsec
,
(1)
where h(x) := −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), Pr[SA 6=
SB] ≤ εcor and (1 − pabort)‖ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖1/2 ≤ εsec.
Thereinto, ρAE represents the joint state of SA and E, UA
is the uniform mixture of all possible values of SA, and
pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts. x and
x denote the lower and upper bounds of observed value
x.
Using the decoy-state method for finite sample
sizes [25], the expected numbers of vacuum event szz
∗
0
and single-photon event szz
∗
1 in ZA can be written as
szz
∗
0 ≥(e
−µpµ + e
−νpν)
nz
∗
0
p0
, (2)
and
szz
∗
1 ≥
µ2e−µpµ + µνe
−νpν
µν − ν2
×
(
eν
nz
∗
ν
pν
−
ν2
µ2
eµ
nz
∗
µ
pµ
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
nz
∗
0
p0
)
,
(3)
where x∗ is the corresponding expected value of given
observed value x, and the upper and lower bounds can
be acquired by using the variant of Chernoff bound [26]
x∗ = x+ β +
√
2βx+ β2,
x∗ = x−
β
2
−
√
2βx+
β2
4
.
with β = ln 22
εsec
. The expected number of single-photon
event sxx
∗
1 in Xω can be given by [22]
sxx
∗
1 ≥
µωe−ωpω
µν − ν2
(
eν
nx
∗
ν
pν
−
ν2
µ2
eµ
nx
∗
µ
pµ
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
nx
∗
0
p0
)
,
(4)
where one exploits the fact that the expected yield of
single-photon prepared in X basis is equal to Z basis given
the same measurement basis X. Besides, the expected
number of bit error txx
∗
1 associated with the single-photon
event in Xω is [22]
t
xx
1 ≤ m
x
ω − t
xx
0 , (5)
with
txx
∗
0 =
e−ωpω
2p0
nx
∗
0 , (6)
where one utilizes the fact that expected value mx
∗
0 =
nx
∗
0 /2. For a given expected value, one can use the Cher-
noff bound to obtain the upper and lower bounds of ob-
served value [26]
x = x∗ +
β
2
+
√
2βx∗ +
β2
4
,
x = x∗ −
√
2βx∗.
The hypothetically observed phase error rate associated
with the single-photon events in ZA can be obtained by
using the random sampling without replacement [26],
φ
zz
1 =
t
xx
1
sxx1
+ γU
(
szz1 , s
xx
1 ,
t
xx
1
sxx1
,
εsec
22
)
, (7)
3FIG. 1. Experimental set-up of the decoy-state BB84 QKD system with time-phase encoding. Alice exploits a master laser,
two slave lasers and an asymmetric interferometer to prepare optical pulses in Z and X basis that are modulated decoy-state
using an intensity modulator, before passing through a set of filter, monitor and attenuator to regulate the photon number per
pulse. Bob utilizes a biased beam splitter to realize a passive basis detection, following which the pulses either go directly to the
time detector or pass through an asymmetric interferometer. A synchronization signal is distributed from Alice to Bob via a
wavelength division multiplexed quantum channel. All of the processing is carried out using a FPGA except for the parameter
estimation realized in ARM. All classical information is transmitted in a classical channel with an independent optical fiber. BS:
beam splitter; Cir: circulator; IM: intensity modulator; FBG: fiber Bragg grating; Att: attenuator; CWDM: coarse wavelength
division multiplexer; FM: Faraday mirror; PS: phase shifter; SPD: single-photon detector; QC: quantum channel; CC: classical
channel.
where
γU (n, k, λ, ǫ) =
(1−2λ)AG
n+k +
√
A2G2
(n+k)2 + 4λ(1 − λ)G
2 + 2 A
2G
(n+k)2
,
(8)
with A = max{n, k} and G = n+k
nk
ln n+k2πnkλ(1−λ)ǫ2 . The
variant of Chernoff bound is used eight times, the Cher-
noff bound is used four times and the random sampling
is used one time. Composing the error terms of finite-
sample, we get the factor is 22, including 9 error terms
due to the smooth min-entropy estimation [25].
III. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION
We built a compact and autonomous time-phase en-
coding QKD system, which continuously distributes se-
cret keys over an optical fiber link using four-intensity
decoy-state BB84 protocol secure against coherent at-
tacks. The physical implementation is outlined in Fig. 1.
The master laser produces phase-randomized 1.6 ns-wide
laser pulses at 1550.12 nm and a repetition rate of 200
MHz. Two pairs of pulses with relative phases 0 and π
at a 2 ns time delay generated by an asymmetric inter-
ferometer are injected into two slave lasers through the
optical circulator, respectively. By controlling the trig-
ger electrical signal of two slave lasers, Alice randomly
prepares quantum states in Z (time) and X (phase) basis
using 400 ps-wide laser pulses. The decoy-state scheme
is stably implemented by using an intensity modulator,
a biased beam splitter with 1:99 and a PIN diode. A
fiber Bragg grating with a 50 GHz nominal bandwidth
is aligned to remove extra spurious emission and pre-
compensate for the pulse broadening in the fiber trans-
mission. The repetition rates of 100 kHz synchronization
pulses with 2 ns-wide at 1310 nm are transmitted from
Alice to Bob via the quantum channel by using wave-
length division multiplexed. The intensities are set as
µ = 0.35, ν = 0.15 and ω = 0.3 with the corresponding
probabilities pµ = 0.78, pν = 0.1 and pω = 0.08.
After the wavelength division demultiplexer, Bob uti-
lizes a biased beam splitter with 3:7 to implement pas-
sive choice measurement basis, where the probability of
70% is detected in time (Z) basis and the probability of
30% is detected in phase (X) basis. The phase variation
of the interferometer is compensated by a phase shifter,
where the feedback algorithm is completed in advanced
RISC machines (ARM). There is a 1.8 dB inherent loss
difference between two bases due to the optical element.
Four 200 megahertz-gated InGaAs/InP single-photon de-
tectors with effective gate width 450 ps are exploited to
4detect quantum signals. The efficiency of detector is 20%
at a 120 dark count per second. The dead times of de-
tectors in Z and X are 3 µs and 5 µs, respectively. The
detection counts of Z and X basis will be affected dif-
ferently due to the dead time, which also introduces the
difference in detection efficiency. The secure and efficient
synchronization scheme [29] is used for four gated-mode
single-photon detectors calibration.
We continuously run this QKD system for two months
over 50.4 km G.652D single-mode fiber with 9.4 dB loss.
The real-time extractable secret key rate is always more
than 60 kbps in the universally composable framework
with εsec = 10
−10. The Winnow algorithm [30] with
1.42 inefficiency of error correction is used to perform
the error correction for a block size of 512 kb. An error
verification is carried out after each error correction via
the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix construction [31] with
64 bit. Privacy amplification will be performed by us-
ing the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the iden-
tity matrix [32] after accumulating data about 4 Mb
with error correction ten times, where the data excludes
the amount of information leaked in error correction. We
exploit lasers with 1270 and 1290 nm and PIN diodes to
realize classical communication with 8B/10B encoding,
which will introduce less noise compared with commer-
cial transceiver if quantum and classic channels share
one fiber. In order to reduce the noise of synchroniza-
tion optical pulses, we discard the count of 100 ns before
and after each synchronization optical pulse. Authenti-
cation, reconciliation, error correction, error verification
and privacy amplification are all carried out in a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) on each side, while
the parameter estimation is proceeded in ARM.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have experimentally realized the four-
intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD with time-phase en-
coding and exploited tight security bounds for finite-
key analysis with composable security against coherent
attacks. Our experiment demonstrates that the basis-
independent detection efficiency condition has been re-
moved with 1.8 dB difference between time and phase
basis of receiver. The stability of our system is very well
due to the time-phase encoding. The phase randomness
and spectral consistency are guaranteed by the pulsed
laser seeding technique [33]. Although the secret key rate
of 60 kbps is not very high over 50 km fiber. It’s enough
for some encrypted tasks, for example, voice communi-
cation. Limiting the secret key generation rate is mainly
due to the system repetition frequency and the satura-
tion count rate of the single-photon detector, which will
be improved in the future.
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